We develop a method for identifying departures from relative factor price equality across regions that is valid under general assumptions about production, markets and factors. Application of this method to the United States reveals substantial and increasing deviations in relative skilled wages across labor markets in both 1972 and 1992. These deviations vary systematically with labor markets'industry structure both in the cross section and over time.
Introduction
Variation in relative factor prices across labor markets is in ‡uential in determining workers'susceptibility to international trade shocks, regional income convergence and the spatial location of industries. Persistence in relative factor reward variation over time also sheds light on the degree to which factor mobility is su¢ cient to arbitrage away factor-price gaps. This paper develops a method for identifying relative factor price di¤erences across regions and uses it to test relative factor price equality in the United States.
Identifying relative factor price equality is a di¢ cult problem for two reasons. First, any method must account for the possibility that factors vary in terms of unobservable quality or composition across labor markets. Regions with superior educational systems or worker training programs, for example, might possess higher-productivity skilled workers than regions without these attributes, thereby inducing higher observed relative skilled wages even if quality-adjusted skill premia are equal. Second, a useful method must correctly identify failures of relative factor price equality in the face of variation in market structure across industries and regions. Such variation in market structure is di¢ cult for econometricians to discern.
Tests of relative factor price equality across countries are common in the international trade literature. 1 However, the scarcity of internationally comparable wage data has motivated the creation of tests that verify the implications of relative wage variation (e.g. production specialization) rather than di¤erences in relative wages directly. 2 The outcomes of these tests suggest signi…cant relative factor price di¤erences across developed and developing economies, but these studies do not typically control for unobserved di¤erences in 1 Empirical tests of factor price equality across countries include Tre ‡er (1993) , Repetto and Ventura (1998) , Davis and Weinstein (2001) , Cunat (2000) , Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) and Schott (2003) . Tests for factor price equality within countries include Davis et al. (1997) and Debaere (2004) who study prefectures in Japan, Debaere (2004) who examines administrative regions in the United Kingdom, and Hanson and Slaughter (2002) who analyze U.S. states.
2 Theoretical conditions necessary for factor price equality have been explored by Samuelson (1949) , McKenzie (1955) , Dixit and Norman (1980) , Wu (1987) , Courant and Deardor¤ (1994) and Deardor¤ (1994) .
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Our method for identifying departures from relative factor price equality is based upon general optimality conditions for producer equilibrium. It possesses a number of important advantages over traditional methods. First, our method is valid under a wide range of assumptions regarding production, markets and factors, including imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale. Second, because it makes no assumptions about the preferences and costs of living faced by di¤erent groups of workers, it is robust to unobserved variation in consumer price indices speci…c to locations. Third, it controls for a variety of measurement issues that can cause observed factor prices to vary even if true, unobserved factor prices are identical, in particular region-factor-industry variation in the quality or composition of factors. Finally, it is easy to implement and can be used in a variety of contexts. The only data required are total payments to factors by industry and region.
Implementing our method, we …nd that the 181 local labor markets in the United States de…ned by the Bureau of Economic Analysis exhibit statistically signi…cant and economically meaningful di¤erences in non-production worker wages relative to production worker wages in both 1972 and 1992. In 1972, for example, di¤erences in relative skilled wages between Nashville and New York City were around 30 percent. By 1992, this di¤erential had risen to 36 percent. Overall, labor markets exhibit increasing relative-wage polarization: dividing U.S. labor markets into three groups according to the signi…cance of their relative skilled wage di¤erences in both years, we …nd that the number of labor markets in the "middle" declines with time as the two groups at either end expand.
We …nd these relative wage di¤erences to be strongly related to labor markets'industry structure. In the cross-section, we …nd that the larger the di¤erence in two labor markets' relative skilled wages, the smaller the number of industries they produce in common. Likewise, in the time-series, i.e. within labor markets across time, we …nd that greater changes in relative skilled wages are associated with a larger number of added and dropped industries: skill premia and industry mix evolve together.
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Neoclassical trade theory provides a useful intuition for these trends. In that framework, su¢ cient heterogeneity of regional factor endowments combined with factor immobility across regions can give rise to an equilibrium in which regions o¤er di¤erent relative factor prices and attract di¤erent sets of industries: skill-scarce regions o¤er a high skill premium and attract industries intensive in unskilled labor, skill-abundant regions o¤er a low skill premium and attract skill-intensive industries.
3 These relative wage di¤erences can persist in equilibrium if factor mobility is imperfect or the prices of immobile amenities (e.g.
housing) vary across regions and account for di¤erent shares of expenditure for skilled and unskilled workers (so that relative wages for the two groups of workers di¤er across regions but real wages for each group are equalized across regions).
Variation in labor markets'industry participation is noteworthy because it implies potential asymmetric exposure of otherwise identical U.S. workers to domestic and international shocks. In particular, it may insulate unskilled workers in skill-intensive regions from the well-known distributional consequences of trade liberalization implied by the factor proportions framework. Because skill-scarce labor markets are more likely to produce goods in common with labor-abundant trading partners like Mexico and China, the wages of unskilled workers in these regions may respond more readily -and negatively -to the price declines associated with falling trade costs. These changes in wages will be in turn associated with either population ‡ows across regions or changes in the price of immobile amenities such as housing.
Relative factor price inequality is also informative about the possibility of regional income convergence within countries. Research in the macroeconomic literature, for example, has found sluggish equilibration of relative per worker income levels across U.S. regions over time. 5 Those …ndings suggest that either relative factor endowments or relative factor prices 3 In the neoclassical model, this outcome is referred to as a multiple cone equilibrium. See, for example, Leamer (1987) . 4 For empirical evidence of imperfect labor mobility, see Bound and Holzer (2000) . For empirical evidence on housing price di¤erences, see for example Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) . 5 See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Carlino and Mills (1993) .
are at best converging slowly. Our demonstration of persistent and increasing relative wage disparities provides evidence of the importance of factor prices, while our use of local labor market areas gives a much higher level of spatial resolution than is typical in the literature.
Our method and results also contribute to the large literature on U.S. income inequality.
A number of papers have demonstrated that U.S. skill premia have risen precipitously over the past few decades. 6 These studies generally document trends either for the U.S. as a whole or for relatively aggregate regions or states within the United States.
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Here we examine di¤erences in relative wages across highly-spatially-disaggregated local labor market areas.
Our …ndings of relative wage di¤erences point to the relevance of regional heterogeneity in understanding the evolution of U.S. aggregate income inequality.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the relevant propositions on relative factor price equality and develops their testable implications. In Section 3, we outline our empirical methodology. Section 4 provides an overview of U.S. regional variation and presents results for our test of relative factor price equality in 1972 and 1992. Section 5 o¤ers evidence on the relation between industry structure and factor prices. Section 6 discusses possible explanations for our …ndings and Section 7 concludes.
Relative Factor Price Equality
Factor price equality can be either absolute or relative. If absolute factor price equality holds (AFPE), regions have identical nominal factor rewards for identical quality-adjusted factors at a point in time. If relative factor price equality holds (RFPE), regions have identical relative factor rewards for identical quality-adjusted factors even though absolute factor prices can di¤er.
We devote our theoretical and empirical attention in this paper to a test of relative factor price equality for three reasons. First, a test of relative factor price equality is more stringent in the sense that relative factor prices can be equal even if absolute factor price equality fails.
Second, as we demonstrate below, relative factor price equality can occur even in the presence of productivity di¤erences across industries and regions. Finally, there is a natural and rich link between variation in regions' relative factor prices and their industry structure, e.g., skill-intensive industries have an incentive to locate in skill-abundant regions. Nonetheless, in the Appendix, we provide a complementary test for absolute factor price equality.
Our method for identifying departures from factor price equality emphasizes the importance of potential unobserved variation in region-industry-factor quality that can bias traditional wage comparisons. We demonstrate how total payments to each factor, i.e., wagebills, can be exploited to control for this unobserved variation.
Production Structure
The value-added production function for industry j and region r is assumed to take the following form:
where A rj is a Hicks-neutral productivity shifter that allows technology to vary across regions and industries and S rj , U rj , and K rj are quality-adjusted inputs of skilled workers, unskilled workers, and capital, respectively. While to simplify the exposition, we consider only three factors of production and many industries, the analysis generalizes immediately to the case of arbitrary numbers of factors of production and industries. Individual factors enter production through the function F j , which is assumed to vary across industries but to be the same across regions within an industry. To the extent that industries contain more-disaggregated products, we therefore assume that technology di¤erences across these products within industries are well approximated by di¤erences in the Hicks-neutral productivity shifter A rj .
Firms in region r and industry j choose factor usage to minimize costs,
such that
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As our analysis exploits cost minimization, …rms can act either as price-takers in product markets (perfect competition; this section) or choose prices subject to a downward sloping demand curve (imperfect competition; next section). While we begin by assuming constant returns to scale, later we extend the analysis to allow for internal and external increasing returns to scale. Similarly, while we begin by assuming that factor markets are perfectly competitive, our analysis can be extended to incorporate labor market imperfections, as long as employment continues to be chosen to minimize costs given factor prices.
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We use a tilde (~) to signify observed quantities that have not been adjusted for quality, and use z rj to denote a quality adjustor for industry j, region r and factor z. Note that z rj allows for unobserved variation in quality that is speci…c to factors, regions and industries.
The quality-adjusted employment level and wage of factor z 2 (S; U; K) in region r equals the observed variable scaled by the quality adjuster, i.e. 
where, without loss of generality, we choose units in which to measure the quality of each factor of production such that factor quality in a reference or base region (b) is equal to one
In our baseline formulation in (1) and (4), we assume that output depends solely on quality-adjusted units of each factor of production (z rj ) and not on their composition between physical units of the factor of production (e z rj ) and quality ( z rj ). As a result, units of a given factor of production are perfect substitutes up to a vertical adjustment for di¤erences in 8 Our analysis is therefore consistent with 'right to manage' models of union behavior, where …rms and unions bargain over wages within an industry but …rms choose employment (see, for example, Farber 1986 and Layard et al. 1991) . For clarity of exposition, we focus on the competitive case in the text, where wages are equalized across industries. With industry-speci…c bargaining, wages will generally vary across industries. As discussed further below, our empirical approach allows for inter-industry wage di¤erentials, because it exploits variation across regions within industries.
Testing for Factor Price Equality 8 factor quality. In a later section, we relax this assumption to allow each factor of production (e.g. skilled workers) to consist of many di¤erent types (e.g. managers and engineers), which are horizontally and vertically di¤erentiated from one another. In that later extension, factor quality ( z rj ) corresponds to an index number that controls for di¤erences in both quality and composition.
The demand for quality-adjusted factor z may be obtained using Shephard's Lemma,
Dividing one …rst-order condition by another provides an expression for the relative demand for any two quality-adjusted factors of production. The relative demand for skilled workers in terms of unskilled workers is
Notice that terms in region-industry productivity, A rj , do not appear in equation (6), since with Hicks-neutral technology di¤erences the direct e¤ect of variation in technology on the marginal revenue product is identical for each factor. In contrast, if technology di¤erences across regions within industries are non-neutral, they will a¤ect the relative marginal revenues of skilled and unskilled labor, and induce variation in the relative demand for these factors of production. Region-industry variation in relative goods prices also has symmetric direct e¤ects on the marginal revenue product of every factor and hence does not appear in equation (6). 9 Using the relationship between quality-adjusted and observed values in (4), this implies the following relative demand for observed factors of production,
Null Hypothesis of Relative Factor Price Equality (RFPE)
Under the null hypothesis that all relative factor prices are equalized (RFPE), qualityadjusted relative wages and factor usage across regions r and b must be equal,
where the second equation follows directly from equation (6).
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Under this null hypothesis of RFPE, observed relative wages and factor usage across regions are given by:
These relationships demonstrate the di¢ culty of using either observed relative wages or observed factor usages to test for factor price equality. Even under the null hypothesis of RFPE, observed relative wages and usages can vary across regions within industries a result of di¤erences in unobserved factor quality (i.e.
S rj 6 = 1 or U rj 6 = 1). 11 We solve this problem by combining observed wages and employment into wagebills, where the wagebill for factor z is equal to w z rj z rj = e w z rj e z rj . As is evident from equation (9), multiplying wages and employment causes region-industry-factor quality adjustors to drop out. As a result, observed relative wagebills, which are generally available to empirical researchers, are equal under the null hypothesis of RFPE,
10 Homogeneity of degree one of the cost function implies that the derivatives @ j =@w ' r are homogenous of degree zero in factor prices. It follows immediately from equation (6) that, with identical quality-adjusted relative factor prices, regions will employ quality-adjusted factors of production in the same proportions.
11 As the factor quality of the base region has been normalized to equal one, ' bj = 1, ' rj 6 = 1 indicates that factor quality di¤ers in industry j between the base region and region r.
Alternative Hypothesis of Non-Relative Factor Price Equality (non-RFPE)
Under the alternative hypothesis of non-RFPE, the quality-adjusted relative w S =w U wage di¤ers across regions r and b by a multiplicative factor,
where again we let region b be the benchmark region: 
Additionally, observed factor usage now varies across regions because of both di¤erences in factor quality and di¤erences in factor demand driven by the variation in quality-adjusted relative factor prices:
Multiplying the expressions for observed relative factor prices and observed relative employments (equations 12 and 13), the terms in unobserved factor quality again cancel. However, relative wagebills now generally vary across regions because of di¤erences in factor prices and variation in factor usage,
where
Interpretation
Together equations (10) and (14) provide the basis for a test of the null hypothesis of RFPE that is robust to unobserved region-industry variation in factor quality. The intuition underlying this method is that, although the empirical researcher cannot observe factor quality or quality-adjusted factor prices, observed factor prices contain information about the quality of observed factors when …rms minimize costs. Multiplying observed factor prices by observed factor quantities enables us to control for unobserved variation in factor quality.
We note that our derivation of the relative wage bill test above makes a number of identifying assumptions: cost minimization, constant returns to scale, Hicks-neutral technology di¤erences, and vertical di¤erentiation of factors of production. Additionally, the null hypothesis that we are testing is that all relative factor prices are equalized. 12 One potential explanation for di¤erences in relative wage bills across regions is therefore di¤erences in the prices of other factors of production that have varying degrees of complementarity and substitutability with skilled and unskilled workers. However, while our test of RFPE is a joint test of our identifying assumptions and the null hypothesis that all relative factor prices are equalized, its ability to control for unobserved di¤erences in factor quality is an important advantage relative to other possible approaches. Furthermore, in subsequent sections below, we show how our identifying assumptions can be relaxed to allow for example for increasing returns to scale and for both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation of factors of production.
If RFPE fails, there are two e¤ects on the relative wagebill for an industry across regions.
The …rst is given in equation (15) directly by the di¤erence in relative wages, SU rb . The second e¤ect, inside the brackets, is due to di¤erences in relative factor usage caused by the variation in relative wages, and thus is also a function of SU rb . Under the assumption that the production technology for a given industry exhibits a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) across all factors of production ( j = 1=(1 j ), where j is the CES parameter for industry j), we obtain the following expression for the di¤erences in relative wage bills:
Therefore, while our test for RFPE using relative wage bills does not require us to make an assumption about the particular functional form of the production technology, it is possible to recover the underlying relative wage di¤erences ( SU rb ) from the estimates of relative wage bill di¤erences ( SU rbj ) if one makes the additional assumption of a CES production technology and assumes a value for the elasticity of substitution.
We note that …nding SU rbj 6 = 1 in our relative wage bill test is su¢ cient but not necessary to reject RFPE. This can be seen by considering the special case of a Cobb-Douglas production technology ( j = 0 in equation 16), in which case relative wage bills are equalized (
even in the presence of di¤erences in quality-adjusted relative wages (
to the extent that we …nd relative wage bill di¤erences ( SU rbj 6 = 1), this result is su¢ cient for us to reject the null hypothesis of RFPE ( SU rb 6 = 1).
13 As shown below, relative wage bills in fact vary substantially across U.S. local labor markets, and therefore the Cobb-Douglas assumption does not appear to provide a close approximation to the data.
Imperfect Competition
As our relative wage bill test exploits cost minimization, we show in this section that it is robust to the introduction of imperfect competition. Suppose that …rms maximize pro…ts subject to a downward sloping inverse demand curve, v rj (Y rj ); under conditions of imperfect competition, which implies the following …rst-order condition for pro…t-maximization:
De…ning the elasticity of demand as " rj (Y rj ) (dY rj =dv rj )v rj =Y rj where v rj denotes price, we obtain the standard result that equilibrium price is a mark-up over marginal cost,
Applying Shephard's Lemma, equilibrium demand for each quality-adjusted factor of production continues to be given by the derivative of the total cost function with respect to the 13 Indeed, the fact that SU rb j =( j 1) is close to 1 for j close to 0 actually makes it harder to reject the null hypothesis of RFPE and strengthens any …nding of a rejection.
factor price as speci…ed in equation (5). Therefore the introduction of imperfect competition leaves the derivation of the test for relative factor price equality above unchanged.
External Economies of Scale
Our framework can also be extended to incorporate external economies of scale under either perfectly or imperfectly competitive market structures. External economies of scale correspond to the assumption that technical e¢ ciency in a region-industry is a function of scale. In the most general case, we have,
where Y r; j is the vector of outputs in all other industries in a region, Y r;j is the vector of all other regions'outputs in the industry, and Y r; j is the vector of all other regions'outputs in all other industries. Because the cost-minimization behavior of the …rm is the same (see equation 2), the derivation of the test for relative factor price equality again remains unchanged.
Internal Economies of Scale
Our analysis can also incorporate internal economies of scale, which clearly must be combined with imperfect competition, and imply that the cost function (3) is no longer linearly homogenous of degree one in output. Under imperfect competition, equilibrium price continues to be a mark-up over marginal cost,
Furthermore, equilibrium demand for quality-adjusted factors of production can again be obtained from Shephard's Lemma, and the relative demand for observed skilled and unskilled workers is given by,
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Multiplying the expressions for observed relative factor prices and observed relative employments, the terms in unobserved factor quality again cancel. The expression for relative wagebills becomes,
where the terms in brackets capturing relative unit factor input requirements are now a function of output, Y .
In the standard case of trade under internal economies of scale in the theoretical literature (Helpman and Krugman 1985) , …rms within an industry face the same constant elasticity of substitution " j , cost functions are homothetic and identical within industries, and there is free entry so that price equals average cost. Combining free entry with the pricing relationship in (20), the equilibrium ratio of average to marginal cost will equal a constant " j =(" j 1), which with homothetic cost functions de…nes a unique equilibrium value of output for all …rms in the industry.
Under the null hypothesis of RFPE, SU rb = 1, and with all …rms in the industry facing the same factor prices and producing the same output, the terms in parentheses in (22) cancel. Therefore we again obtain the prediction that relative wagebills are equalized under the null hypothesis of RFPE. 14 More generally, in the presence of internal economies of scale, variation in …rm size across regions and industries can in ‡uence relative factor demands and provides a potential explanation for rejections of RFPE.
Factor Quality and Factor Composition
While our analysis has so far assumed vertical di¤erentiation of factors of production, in this section we show that the analysis can be extended to allow each factor of production (e.g. skilled workers) to consist of many di¤erent types (e.g. managers and engineers), which are horizontally and vertically di¤erentiated from one another. We assume that the production technology is weakly separable in skilled and unskilled workers, so that …rms …rst choose optimal quantities of skilled and unskilled workers before choosing optimal amounts of worker types within these categories. We demonstrate the point formally for skilled workers, but, without loss of generality, the argument applies for any factor of production.
Though, for simplicity, we consider two types of skilled workers, the analysis goes through for any number of skill types. For notational convenience, we suppress region and industry subscripts throughout this section.
Assume the quality-adjusted ‡ow of skilled labor services is a constant returns to scale function of the quality-adjusted ‡ow of managerial and engineering services:
where S is quality-adjusted skilled labor services, S 1 is quality-adjusted managerial services, S 2 is quality-adjusted engineering services, ( ) is assumed to be linearly homogenous of degree one, e S = e S 1 + e S 2 is the observed number of skilled workers, S 1 is the quality of managers, S 2 is the quality of engineers, and e n 1 S 1 =( e S 1 + e S 2 ) and e n 2 e S 2 =( e S 1 + e S 2 ) are the observed shares of engineers and managers in skilled employment. Equation (23) may be re-written more compactly as:
where the quality of skilled workers ( S ) is now an index number, which captures the quality of managers, the quality of engineers, and the composition of skilled workers between these two groups.
The quality-adjusted wage of skilled workers is now a price index, de…ned as the dual to equation (23):
where ! 1 is the quality-adjusted wage of managers and ! 2 is the quality-adjusted wage of engineers.
Expenditure on quality-adjusted skilled worker services is equal to observed expenditure on skilled workers:
where w S is the price index de…ned above and e w S is the observed wage per skilled worker. It follows that the quality-adjusted skilled worker price index and the observed skilled worker wage are related according to:
It is evident from equations (24) and (27) that the derivation of the test for relative factor price equality remains exactly the same as above and is unchanged by this extension.
Econometric Speci…cation
In Section 2 we showed that under the null of RFPE the ratio of the skilled workers'
wagebill to the unskilled workers' wagebill is the same across regions within an industry.
This implies that, for an industry j, each region's relative wagebill equals the value for any base region b and, in particular, for the United States as a whole,
The simplest test of the null hypothesis is therefore to regress the log of the ratio of wagebills for region r relative to the ratio for the U.S. on a set of region dummies,
where RW B 
A test of whether the While our test for relative factor price equality does not require us to assume a particular functional form for the production technology, under the assumption of a CES production technology and given a choice for the elasticity of substitution , the estimated coe¢ cients on the regional dummies may be used to derive implied quality-adjusted relative wages and unobserved factor quality across regions via equation (16). We use this result to interpret our empirical results below.
Note that equations (29) and (30) compare the relative wagebill for skilled and unskilled workers in region r to the value in a base region within each industry j. This is a 'di¤erence in di¤erences'speci…cation with a number of attractive statistical properties. Any industryspeci…c determinant of relative wagebills that is common across regions is 'di¤erenced-out' when we normalize relative to the base region on the left-hand side of the equations (e.g. compensating di¤erentials across industries, other inter-industry wage di¤erentials, industryspeci…c labor market institutions such as the degree of unionization, di¤erences across industries in the classi…cation of workers between skilled and unskilled). The analysis thus explicitly controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the determinants of relative wagebills across industries.
Similarly, in both region r and the base region we analyze the wagebill of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers. Therefore, any region-speci…c determinant of wagebills that is common to both skilled and production workers is 'di¤erenced-out' when we construct a region's relative wagebill (RW B 
Empirical Implementation
In this section we apply our methodology to test for relative factor price equality across 16 As noted above, our methodology explicitly controls for di¤erences in the quality and composition of these two categories of workers across regions and industries. We use four-digit Standard Industrial Classi…cation (SIC4) industry classi…cation to focus on narrowly-de…ned industries for which the assumption of a common production technology up to a Hicks-neutral productivity shifter is likely to be a more reasonable approximation.
For the same reason, we exclude any four-digit industry code that explicitly includes miscellaneous products (i.e., SIC4 codes ending in '9'). This pruning leaves us with 401 of the original 458 SIC4 industries covering 88 percent of manufacturing output and 86 percent of manufacturing employment. The relative wagebill results in Table 1 can be used to estimate relative skilled wage di¤erences in individual labor markets by assuming CES production, as noted in equations (15) and (16) above. Nashville and New York City, for example, have signi…cantly di¤erent relative wagebills for non-production and production workers, and thus signi…cantly di¤erent relative wages. In 1972 the average relative wagebill across all industries in Nashville is 10 percent below the U.S. average while that for New York is 15 percent above. Twenty years later, the gap between the two labor markets had widened to 34 percent. Assuming CES production technologies and an elasticity of substitution of 2 between production and non-production workers (i.e. = 0:5) in both years, these wagebill di¤erences imply that quality-adjusted relative wages were 1.30 and 1.36 times higher in Nashville than in New York in 1972 and 1992, respectively. 18 Therefore, while the absolute level of skilled wages can be higher in New York than in Nashville, and while factor quality and composition can vary between the two locations, our estimates imply that skilled workers of the same quality receive lower relative wages in New York than in Nashville.
Testing RFPE
We assign LMAs to factor-price cohorts based on the sign and signi…cance (at the 10 percent level) of the coe¢ cients reported in Table 1 . Figures 1 and 2 display the distribution of regions across cohorts for 1972 and 1992, respectively. Regions with relative skilled 17 The hypothesis that all the LMA coe¢ cients are equal to zero is rejected at the 1 percent level in both 1972 and 1992. 18 An elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers greater than unity is consistent with empirical estimates in the labor literature (Katz and Autor 1999). wagebills that are signi…cantly higher than those for the aggregate United States are grouped in cohort A (black shading), while those with relative skilled wagebills that signi…cantly lower are assigned to cohort C (cross-hatching). The remaining labor markets, with relative skilled wagebills that are not signi…cantly di¤erent from the U.S. as a whole, are placed in cohort B.
Regions in cohort A have higher relative wagebills and thus lower relative wages for skilled workers of the same quality, while regions in cohort C have higher relative wages for skilled workers of the same quality. Using the same assumption for the elasticity of substitution between factors as above, we estimate the average quality-adjusted relative skilled wage to be 11 percent higher and 21 percent lower than the national average in cohorts C and A, respectively, in 1972. The comparable percentages for 1992 are, respectively, 10 percent higher for C and 16 percent lower for A.
As indicated in Table 1 and highlighted in Figures 1 and 2 , there is substantial movement of labor markets across cohorts between 1972 and 1992. In 1972 there are 9, 126, and 46 labor markets in the A, B and C cohorts, respectively. The corresponding …gures are 16, 107 and 58 for 1992. Twenty-seven labor markets jump to a higher relative wagebill cohort over the sample period, while 34 regions drop to a lower relative wagebill cohort. These movements suggest a polarization of U.S. labor markets across wage cohorts over time.
Our second speci…cation for testing for relative factor price equality is the complete set of bivariate regressions captured by equation (30). Because there are far too many coe¢ cients to report (32,580 per year when every region is used as a base), we report a summary of rejections in Table 2 . 19 In 1972, 19 percent of the region-pairs reject relative factor price equality at the 10 percent level, while 13 percent reject at the 5 percent level. Every region rejects with at least 3 other regions. In 1992, 24 percent of the region pairs reject relative factor price equality at the 10 percent level, 17 percent reject at the 5 percent level. Every region rejects with at least 3 other regions.
Both speci…cations provide strong evidence against the hypothesis that all regions in the 19 Disclosure of individual coe¢ cients from Table 2 is also not possible under Title XIII of the Bureau of Census.
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United States face the same relative factor prices in either 1972 or 1992. After controlling for unobserved variation in factor quality, we …nd that labor markets in the U.S. vary signi…cantly in terms of relative wages, and that relative wages for workers of the same quality are lower in areas with greater supplies of skilled workers. In the next section we explore the link between relative wage variation and industry structure.
RFPE and Industry Specialization
As an additional check on our estimates of relative factor price di¤erences, we examine whether they are systematically related to di¤erences in production structure, as implied by neoclassical theories of trade and production. If there is a single cone of diversi…cation where all regions produce all goods with the same production technologies and facing the same goods prices, neoclassical theory implies that factor prices are equalized when the number of goods is equal to or greater than the number of factors of production. In contrast, if there are multiple cones of diversi…cation, neoclassical theory implies that regions with di¤erent relative factor prices specialize in di¤erent sets of industries. Skill-abundant regions with lower quality-adjusted relative skilled wages specialize in skill-intensive industries, while labor-abundant regions with higher quality-adjusted relative skilled wages specialize in laborintensive industries.
To investigate whether our estimates of di¤erences in quality-adjusted relative wages are systematically related to production structure, we begin in Table 3 We now test whether larger di¤erences in relative skilled wages across labor markets are associated with smaller overlaps in the industries they produce, both in the cross-section and over time.
Industry Mix Across Regions
We examine whether the overlap in industry mix between two regions is negatively correlated with the di¤erence in their quality-adjusted relative factor prices by running an OLS regression of the number of industries two regions have in common on the distance between regions'relative wagebills,
where j SU rb j is the absolute value of the regression coe¢ cient from equation (30) is the absolute value of the change in region r's wagebill ratio relative to the U.S. between 1972 and 1992 (Table 1) . These changes range from 0.005 to 0.6 with a median of 0.07.
Results are reported in Table 5 . Consistent with the idea that relative wages in ‡uence production location decisions, we …nd that industry churning and changes in estimated wagebill ratios are positively and signi…cantly correlated. The implied value of CHU RN r for the median change in relative wagebill ratios is 7.5 percentage points.
Taken together, the results of Tables 4 and 5 indicate that our estimates of di¤erences in quality-adjusted relative wages are indeed systematically related to di¤erences in production structure, as expected from the neoclassical theory of trade and production.
Conclusions
This paper develops a methodology for testing whether factor prices are equal across geographic regions. It is based on cost minimization by …rms and invokes only general assumptions about production, markets and factors. In particular, the method can identify departures from relative factor price equality in the presence of unobserved variation in the 21 We note that regional product mixes may not be mutually exclusive because some goods with very high transport costs, such as cement, are largely untraded. quality and composition of factors of production across both industries and regions. The test is relatively easy to implement in that it requires data only on the total payments to factors (e.g. wagebills) by industry and region. Even though the researcher cannot observe factor quality or quality-adjusted factor prices, observed relative wage bills contain information on unobserved quality-adjusted relative factor prices when …rms minimize costs.
We use our methodology to test for relative factor price equality across 181 U.S. labor markets areas in 1972 and 1992. The data reject the null hypothesis that all regions o¤er the same relative factor prices in both years. Results indicate substantial relative wage variation across skill-scarce and skill-abundant labor markets. We also …nd that the estimated di¤erences in relative wages are systematically related to industrial structure: the greater the di¤erence in relative wages across a region pair, the greater the di¤erence in the pair's industry structure. This relationship is also evident within regions across time:
regions experiencing larger changes in relative wages between 1972 and 1992 undergo larger changes in the set of industries they produce.
The association we …nd between regions' relative wages and their industry structure suggests U.S. labor markets may be asymmetrically exposed to domestic and external shocks: a common industry shock can have heterogeneous e¤ects across regions depending on the industries in which they are specialized. Further examination of this link has potential to shed light on several issues in economics, including the ability of skill-scarce regions to catch up with skill-abundant regions, the impact of trade liberalization on U.S. relative wages, and the e¤ects of asymmetric shocks in optimum currency areas.
Finally, we note that our approach to characterizing factor price inequality might usefully be applied to other settings where unobserved variation in quality is an important problem for identi…cation. A similar test based on consumer expenditure minimization, for example, could be developed to test the law of one price across geographic areas.
A Appendix A: Absolute Factor Price Equalization (AFPE)
This appendix develops a test for absolute factor price equality that controls for unobserved factor quality. Like our test for relative factor price equality, it makes use of the result that factor quality terms cancel when observed wages and observed employment levels are multiplied.
To test absolute factor price equalization (AFPE) we analyze variation across regions in the share of total payments to a factor of production in output. Though our demonstration here is for skilled workers, the analysis for other factors of production is analogous. Observed employment of skilled workers may be obtained from equations (4) and (2). Multiplying observed employment by observed wages and dividing by output, we obtain,
where, from the total cost function (3), A Additionally, the equality of the absolute level of factor prices requires identical production technologies across regions and industries (A rj = A bj ). Therefore, combining identical production technologies and identical quality-adjusted factor prices, we obtain the prediction that unit input requirements for quality-adjusted factors are the same across regions. Therefore, under the null hypothesis of AFPE, factor shares in equation (33) are equalized across regions,
Under the alternative hypothesis of non-AFPE, technical e¢ ciency may vary across regionindustry pairs, and regions may be characterized by di¤erent quality-adjusted factor prices 
Together, equations (34) and (35) Table 3 ). Robust standard errors noted below each coefficient. 
